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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.J. BRACI{EN LEE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
STATE OF l'TAH, BOARD OF STATE 
CAN'T ASSER.S. SHER~fAN J. PREECE, 
State Auditor, ::'1Hl \V ALTER L. BUDGE, 
1\._ttorney General, SID LAMBOURNE, 
State Treasurer, members of the Board 
of State Canvassers, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
9439 
BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANTS 
XATl~RJ~ OF CASE 
The question presented is \Yhef1er Article VII, Sec-
tion 24 of the Constitution of the State of Utah \':as valid-
ly adopted by the electorate of the State on November 
8, 1960, and \vhether it is in full force and effect, or 
\vhether it \Yas not properly adopted or is other,vise void 
and of no effect. 
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DISPOSITION BEFORE LOWER COURT 
Upon joint motions for summary judgment (R. 25, 
26), the trial court ruled, that Article VII, Section 24 
of the Utah State Constitution, submitted to the elector-
ate for adoption on November 8, 1960, being proposed 
Constitutional Amendment Number One on the ballot of 
November 8, 1960, was null and void and of no force and 
effect, and entered its decree on July 26, 1961, so de-
claring. (R. 27, 28). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants and appellants seek reversal of the 
trial court's determination that Article ·y·Ir, Section 2-± 
of the Utah Constitution is null and void, and a declara-
tion that it is valid and in full force and effect. 
STATEMENT OF F_A_CTS 
On December 28, 1960, the plaintiff filed an action 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, seeking a judgn1ent declaring that the pro-
posed Constitutional Amendlnent Ktunber One, sub1nitted 
to the electorate at the general election held on X ove1nber 
8, 1960, and declared adopted by the defendants as nleln-
bers of the State :Board of Election Canvassers, "~a 8 null 
and void. (R. 1-10). Thereafter. a 1notion to dis1niss ,Yas 
filed by the defendants on the grounds that the plain-
tiff had no standing to bring the action, and that the 
court was other,vise 'vithout jurisdiction over the subject 
matter. (R. 19). The n1otion "~as argued on February 
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13, 1961, and denied on ~lareh 1, 1961. (R. 20). There-
after this Court denied on interlocutory appeal and the 
defendants filed an ans\vPr to plaintiff's complaint. (R. 
17). 
The facts upon which the decision of the lower court 
'vas based were stipulated to by the parties for the pur-
poses of summary judgment. (R. 21). 
It appears that during the 1959 session of the Utah 
Legislature a joint resolution was adopted purporting to 
amend Article VII of the Utah c·onstitution by adding a 
ne\v Section 24 to provide for the ''continuity of state 
and local government operations in periods of emergency 
resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack'.' (R. 
22). The resolution, in full, read (R. 22): 
"N ot\vi thstanding any general or special pro-
visions of the Constitution the legislature, in order 
to insure continuity of state and local govern-
mental operations in periods of emergency re-
sulting from disasters caused by enemy attack, 
shall have the power and the immediate duty (1) 
to provide for prompt and temporary succession 
to the powers and duties of public offices, of \\That-
ever nature and \vhether filled by election or ap-
pointment, the incumbents of which may become 
unavailable for carrying on the powers and duties 
of such office, and ( 2) to adopt such other meas-
ures as 1nay be necessary and proper for insur-
ing the continuity of governmental operations in-
cluding, but not limited to the financing thereof. 
In the exercise of the powers hereby conferred 
the legislature shall in all respects conform to the 
requirements of this Constitution except to the ex-
tent that in the judgment of the legislature so to 
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do would be impracticable or would admit of un-
due delay. 
The Secretary of State is directed to su~mit 
this proposed amendment to the electors of the 
State of Utah at the next General Election in the 
manner provided by la\v." 
In addition, House Bills 83, 82 and and 81 were 
passed by the Legislature and signed into la\V contingent 
upon the adoption of the ne\v proposed constitutional 
a1nendment relating to continuity of government. (R. 23). 
These acts provided for e1nergency executive, legislative 
and judicial officers, and for relocation of the seat of 
government in the event of the necessity, due to enemy 
attack or threatened attack. (R. 23-2±). 
Thereafter, the joint resolution was published in a 
newspaper in each county for a period of two months 
before the election held on X oven1ber 8, 1960. (R. 22). 
A ballot bearing two constitutional amendments \vas 
sub1nitted to the electorate on ~\ ove1nber 8, 1960. The 
a1nend.Inents were set off in blocks and entitled HCon-
stitutional Amend1nent ::.\u1nber One" and~· Constitutional 
An1endment Number T,\-o." Each block contained a space 
to be marked "For" or HAgainst'' each proposed anlend-
ment. Amend1nent Nun1ber One dealt \vith the continuity 
of government provisions, and Arnend1nent Xun1ber Tw·o 
\Vas concerned with tax exemptions ... A_ san1ple of the bal-
lot is attached to plaintiff's co1nplaint. (R. 10-11). The 
language of A1nendment Nun1ber One \Yas as follows: 
"Shall Section 2± of .A.rticle \Til of the Con-
stitution of the State of lTtal1, be a1nended to grant 
~emporary emergency po\vers to the Legislature 
1n the event of \var or en1ergency caused by "'"ar." 
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At the election on ~\ oveutber 8, 1960, a total of 3i-±,-
981 persons cast ballot:s, 37-1:,609 persons voting in the 
presidential race, 371,-tS9 persons voted in the guberna-
torial race, and ~u:2,101 persons voted on Proposed 
~t\.1nendment Nun1ber One. Out of the votes cast on the 
.1\1nendment, 171,',~{)~ persons favored adoption of the 
e:unendrnent and 120,339 opposed it. Approximately 58 
percent of the voters voting on Amendment Number One 
favored it. Slightly less than 46 percent of the total 
persons casting votes on any issue at the general election 
favored the amendrnent since not all voters voting at the 
election cast a vote on the proposition contained in Pro-
posed Amendment Number One. (R. 22). Based upon 
the votes east, defendants declared the amend1nent 
adopted. 
The plaintiff sought to have the amendment declared 
null and void on four bases. First,. that the number of 
votes favoring adoption does not raeet the constitutional 
requirements of Article XXIII relating to amendment 
of the State Constitution. Second, that the amend1nent 
was not a single amend.1nent, but 'vas in fact t'vo or Inore 
arnendments, and was void for failing to be submitted 
in such a manner as to allow th_e electors to vote on each 
amendment separately. Third, that it was not submitted 
to the electorate in proper form. Fourth, that the Pro-
posed Amendment 'Yould contravene the provisions of 
the Federal Constitution guaranteeing a republican form 
of government and ,, .. ould also contravene Article I, Sec-
tion 2 of the State Constitution by removing the political 
power from the people. It is submitted that an examina-
tion of each of these contentions will show them to be 
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without merit, and that the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment declaring Article VII, Section 24 
to be null and void. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS 
NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR WANT OF SUFFICIENT VOTES 
FOR APPROVAL. 
POINT II. 
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE STATE CON-
STITUTION, ARTICLE VII, SECTION 24, DID NOT VIOLATE 
ARTICLE XXIII, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION REQUIRING THAT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS BE 
SEPARATELY SUBMITTED TO THE ELECTORS. 
POINT III. 
THE AMENDMENT WAS NOT DEFECTIVE FOR FAlL-
URE TO SUBMIT THE AMENDl\lEI~T TO THE ELECTOR-
ATE IN PROPER FORM. 
POINT IV. 
THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE IV, SECTION 4 OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION NOR AMEND OR CONTRADICT 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
ARGl~~fEXT 
POINT I. 
THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS 
NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR WANT OF SUFFICIENT VOTES 
FOR APPROVAL. 
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The plaintiff contends that the proposed amend1nent 
was not properly adopted because there was an insuffi-
eient number of votes cast in favor of the amendment. It 
should be rememberd that in excess of 58 percent of those 
persons who voted on the proposed amendment registered 
their vote as favoring adoption, and that this was about 
.fG percent of the vote cast. The question for decision, 
then, is whether the Utah Constitution requires a major-
ity of the persons voting thereon, or a majority of all 
votes cast, no matter what issues are joined with the 
amendment at the general election~ 
The proposed amendment "\vas the result of legisla-
tive action by joint resolution. It was not a proposal em-
anating from a Constitutional Convention. Article XXIII 
of the Utah Constitution deals with amendment and re-
vision. The three sections under that article provide 
two means for amending the Constitution. Article XXIII, 
Section 1, provides for amendment upon action of the 
Legislature. Article XXIII, Sections 2 and 3 relate to the 
other means of amending the Constitution, that being by 
way of a specially called Constitutional Convention. 
Since the proposed amendment was the result of a joint 
legislative action, the provision for amending the Con-
stitution that must determine if the amendment was 
validly adopted is Article XXIII, Section 1, "\vhich pro-
vides: 
"Any amend1nent or amend1nents to this Con-
stitution may be proposed in either house of the 
Legislature, and if two-thirds of all the members 
elected to each of the two houses, shall vote in 
favor thereof, such proposed amendment or 
amendments shall be entered on their respective 
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journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon; 
and the Legislature shall cause the same to be 
published in at least one newsp,aper in every 
county of the State, where a newspaper is pub-
lished, for two months immediately preceding the 
next general election at which time the said 
amendment or an1end~ents shall be submitted to 
the electors of the State, for their approval or 
rejection, and if a major'ity of the electors voti·1lg 
thereon shall approve the same, such amendment 
or amendments shall become part of this Constitu-
tion. If two or n1ore a1nendments are proposed, 
they shall be so submitted as to enable the elec-
tors to vote on each of them separately." 
The pertinent part of this section is that referring 
to the electors necessary for adoption. On this point the 
section reads : 
"'* * * if a 1najority of the electors voti.ng 
thereon shall approve the sa1ne, such amendment 
or amendments shall b2con1e nart of this Consti-
.L 
tution." 
It is generally saiu that rules of statutory construc-
tion are applicable in assisting in eonst1·uing a consti-
tution, B,adger v. If oidale, 88 ~--,.2d 208; 16 C.J.S., Consti-
tutional La"T' Sec. 15, and in this regard, \\Tords are to be 
given their natural, obvious or ordinary n1eaning. Sou.th-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n. c. U·nited States, 323 l .... S. 
533; Genera.[ Electric Conzpany ~·. Thr,zfty Sales, 5 U.2d 
326, 301 P.2d 7-1:1 (1956); 16 C.J.S., Constitutional La,Y, 
Sec. 19. 
In applying this maxim to the language of the l~tah 
Constitution, it appears clear that "·hat 'vas intended ":oas 
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that only a majority of the persons who voted on the issue 
favor adoption to effect approval. In the case of Breck-
hause v. Hill, 268 S.W. 865 (Ark. 1925), the Arkansas 
Supreme Court had before it a similar allegation to that 
now urged by the plaintiff. In that case 125,700 persons 
had voted on the gubernatorial issue, but only 52,000 to 
56,000 votes were cast favoring the adopting of certain 
constitutional amendments. The Arkansas Constitution 
contained the words ''voting thereon" similar to that 
of Utah. The court upheld the adoption of the amend-
ments. Subsequently, in Coombs v. Gray, 281 S.W. 918 
(Ark. 1926), the same court reaffirmed the interpretation. 
In Battle Creek Brewing Co. v. Board of Sup·'rs. of Cal-
houn County, 131 N.,V. 160 (Mich. 1911), the Michigan 
Supreme Court held the word's "voting thereon" meant 
those who actually passed on the proposition and not just 
those who cast blank ballots. In Keelams v. Compton, 
206 S.W. 2d 498 (l\fo. 1947), the Missouri Supreme Court 
said with reference to the plain meaning of the words 
"voting thereon" as appeared in Article VI, Section 26 
( 6) of the Missouri Constitution: 
"In any event it has been definitely detel·-
mined that 'two-thirds of the qualified electors 
* * * voting thereon, * * *' means 'two-thirds of 
those who actually vote for or against the given 
proposition, "\Yhether such two-thirds be two-thjrds 
or not of all the voters taking part in the election 
otherwise * * *.' '\r otes cast on the proposition' 
and 'voting thereon' are to be construed in their 
irdinary and usual sense and they mean 'express-
ing the 'vill, mind or preference; casting, or a 
vote.' They do not include votes or ballots that do 
not cast a vote on the proposition." 
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Thus it would appear clear that the plain Inean_Ing 
of Article XXIII, Section 1 would require only a maJor-
ity of the votes actually expressing an opinion or prefer-
ence on the amendment. 
If son1e persons desire not to vote on an issue, it 
certainly is a fair inference that they leave the matter 
to those who, in their discretion, see fit to pass on the 
matter. In Cass County v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360 (1877), 
it was said: 
''This we understand to be the established 
rule as to the effect of elections, in the absence of 
any statutory regulation to the ·contrary. All 
qualified voters \Yho absent themselves from an 
election duly called are prestuned to assent to 
the expressed will of the majority of those vot-
ing, unless the law providing for the election 
otherwise declares * * *." 
This is certainly the recognized majority rule. See 131 
ALR 1382, where it is said: 
"It seems that by the ,,~eight of authority 
blank ballots are not to be counted in arriving 
at the total vote cast for the purpose of deterinin-
ing a majority." 
Applying these propositions to the question now before the 
Court, is there any reason to assume other than that those 
who did not vote on the proposed constitutional amend-
ment left the proposition to those \Yho sa"~ fit to exercise 
their franchise~ A p~erson is no less absent because 
he fails to vote one \Ya~~ or the other on a ballot than if 
he never appeared. In a de1nocracy the government IS 
said to operate on the basis of the active participation of 
10 
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its citizenry. Certainly the founding fathers "\vould not 
have intended a n1eaning that 'vould n1ake the result go 
off on phlegmatic inactivity. 
Other states having similar prov1s1ons have con-
strued their constitutions contrary to the position no'v 
urged by the plaintiff. ln Green v. Board of Canvasser . .,. 
5 Idaho 130, 47 Pac. 259 (1896), the Idaho Supren1e Court 
concerned itself '"ith Section 1, Article 20 of their 
State Constitution, 'vhicl1 is less specific than that of 
Utah. The Idaho provision read: 
'•* * * if a majority of the electors shall ratify 
the same, such amendment or amendn1ents shall 
become a part of this Constitution." 
'l,he facts of the case disclose that a proposed constitu-
tional amendment had not received approval fro1n the 
tnajority of persons "Tl1o cast ballots at the general elec-
tion, but had received approval from those who sa"~ fit 
to vote on the issue. The Idaho Court, in answer to the 
same contention as is made by plaintiff here, stated at 
page 260 of 47 Pacific Reporter: 
''* * * Experience has shown that it is almost, 
if not quite, an impossibility to secure an e::~pres­
sion fro1n every elector upon any question, and, 
above all, upon a question of an amendment of the 
constitution; and it is equally difficult to ascertain 
the actual number of electors at any given tirne. 
To rely upon the vote cast upon some other ques-
tion at the same election would be entirely un-
satisfactory, and such a construction is~ 've thin_k, 
at least in1pliedly nu~atived by the provisions of 
section 3. \Vhile it is true that some 10,000 or 
more electors \\~otlld seem to have been entirely 
11 
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indifferent upon the question of the adoption of 
this and the other amendments, still all were-
must have been-fully advised as to the impor~­
ance of the questions submitted, and sho~ld their 
indifference be taken as conclusive of their oppo-
sition to the amendments~ Upon what rule of 
honesty or righteousness can this be claimed~ 
Is it not more rea~onable, as well as mo~e right-
eous, to say that In a matter about which they 
manifest such indifference their silence shall be 
taken as assent~ We hold that the amendment 
under discussion is adopted, and has become a 
part of the contitution of the state of Idaho." 
In Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 \\Tisc. 572, in reference to 
the same argwnent urged here, the \)~isconsin Court 
said: 
"* * * Under the provisions of our consti tu-
tion, as 'veil as of other constitutions, persons are 
elected to a particular office \vho have a majority 
of the votes cast-not for the candidates for son1e 
other office, but for the candidates for that of-
fice. Measures or la,Ys are also declared adopted 
or rejected according as tLey receiYe or fail to re-
ceive each a Inajority of the votes cast for or 
against it. To d'eclare a 1neasure or la'v adopted 
or defeated - not by the nmnber of votes east 
directly for or against it, but by the number cast 
for and against son1e other 111easure .. or for the 
candidates for so1ne office or offire8 not connected 
with the measure itself, "Tould not onlY be out 
of the ordinary course of legislation, b~t, so far 
as we lrnow, a thing unkno"Tn in the historY of 
constitutional law. * * *" ' 
It is submitted that as concerns the provisions of the 
Utah Constitution, the 1natter is clearly against the 
construction plaintiff proposes to give .... ~rticle XXIII, 
12 
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Section 1. In. Re 'Jlodd, 208 Ind. 168, 193 N.E. 865; DeSoto 
Parrish v. lV,illianJ,~', 49 La.Ann. 422, 21 So 647. 
Before laying this rnatter to rest it is well to note the 
argument raised by plaintiff at trial below that Section 
3 of Article XXIII, relating to adoption of amendments 
or revision of the Constitution by requiring a' 'a majority 
of the electors of the State voting at the next general 
election" requires more than Section 1, and hence the 
frarners couldn't have intended two different standards. 
In Green v. Board of Canvassers, 5 Idaho 130 ,47 Pac. 
259 (1896), the Idaho Court, when faced with the same 
argument, rejected the contention that two different 
standards could not have been intended, saying: 
"* * * We kno\v of no rule of construction, nor 
has our attention been called to any, that would 
warrant us in arbitrarily saying that the language 
used in the two sections was intended to mean 
the same thing. On the contrary, the reason seems 
to us to be the other way. We can understand 
why the makers of the constitution should apply 
a different and 1nore stringent rule in the adop-
tion of a call for a constitutional convention fro1n 
what they 'vould in the matter of a mere amend-
ment. * * *" 
On the other hand, the Arkansas Supreme Court in 
Coombs v. Gray, 281 S.,V. 918 (Ark. 1926), agreed with 
the general proposition that both sections should be 
harmoniously construed, saying: 
"It would be doing violence to the design of 
the framers of the amendment to attribute to them 
an intention to require less number of votes to 
adopt an amend'lnent proposed by the people un-
13 
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der the power of the initiative than one submitted 
by the legislature." 
However, instead of saying a majority of those voting 
at the general election must pass on the amendment, it 
said only a majority of those who expressly vote on the 
issue is needed to adopt an amendment. 
The recorded proceedings of the Constitutional Con-
vention provide a simple ans\ver to the Utah situation. 
Sections 1, 2 and 3 were introduced at different times 
and by different sponsors. Section 1 \Yas introduced by 
Delegate Eichnor. Proceedings of Constitutional Co11r 
venti·on, p. 157. Delegate Chidester introduced the pro-
vision relative to Sections ~ and 3. Op. cit., p. 113. The 
Com1nittee on Amendments considered both sections and 
favorably reported then1. Op. cit., p. :2-±3. On the floor 
of the Convention, Section 1 of ~l.rticle XXIII was adopt-
ed \\'"ith no change being made relative to the provision 
of "a majority of the electors voting thereon" being re-
quired for adoption. Op. cit., 406 ..... \s to Section 1, it \vas 
al\vays apparently conte1nplated that single a1nendments 
would be submitted at a general election. HoweYer, such 
was not the case as to an1end1nents by Constitutional 
Convention. Thus Section 3, as introduced originally~ 
read: 
"Any constitution adopted by such convention 
shall have no validity until it has been sub1nitted 
to and adopted by a n1ajority of the electors voting 
at saild election." 
A reading of the debate at pages 675-677 of the Proceed-
ings of the Constitutional Convention Inakes it clear 
14 
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that \vhat was intended "\Yas t\vo \\·ays of amending the 
Constitution. First, by the action of the Legislature and 
the electoratP a~., to single an1end1nents, and second, by 
a Constitutional Convelltion \vith adoption of the revised 
Constitution by a special election to be held for that pur-
pose. Subsequently, Delegate Squires felt that a special 
election \\Tould be too costly, and also there was concern 
that possibly a Constitutional Convention would only 
recommend one or two changes which could be handled 
at a general election. Thus, Delegate Squires said "\vith 
reference to the reason for changing the language of Sec-
tion 3 from ''said election'' to "general election'': 
""That was 1ny idea, to save the expense of a 
special election on the subject." 
Thus, the reason for the apparent difference between 
Sections 1 and 3 of Article XXIII is apparently because 
of the failure to note the distinction "\vhen the money sav-
ing change "\Yas 1nade. Thus the facts seem clearly to 
support a contention that the framers intended only 
that those persons \\Tho actually cast votes would be 
counted in determining the numerical majority, where 
the issue was voted on at a general election. As originally 
contemplated by the Section 3 form of amendment, the 
only persons casting ballots would be persons voting 
on the convention issues, and there was no need for the 
specific language used in Section 1 pertaining to general 
elections. Thereafter, when the amendment was made, 
the language relating to the required majority "\vas over-
looked and not changed. Thus, it seems clear that the in-
tention of the framers was to require only a majority 
of the persons voting on the amendment cast votes in 
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favor of it for it to be adopted, where a general election 
is the means used to subn1it the matter to the voters. 
It is submitted, therefore, that plaintiff's position 
as to the required majority is not well taken, and no ob-
jection to Article VII, Section 24, can be raised with ref-
erence to its failure to achieve the requisite number of 
affirmative votes. 
POINT II. 
THE PROPOSED AME1~DMENT TO THE STATE CON-
STITUTION, ARTICLE VII, SECTION 24, DID NOT VIOLATE 
ARTICLE XXIII, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION REQUIRING THAT PROPOSED Al\IENDMENTS BE 
SEPARATELY SUBMITTED TO THE ELECTORS. 
Plaintiff contends that the proposed constitutional 
a1nendment violates Article XJ.:III, Section 1 of the l~tah 
Constitution, which provides: 
~·If two or 1nore anzend/n!ents are proposed_. 
they shall be so sub1nitted as to enable the electors 
to vote on each of the1n separately.'~ 
In the instant case, t\vo a1nendl:nents ""ere proposed, to-
wit : Article "\TII, Section 24, adding the continuity of 
government provision, and a proposal to a1nend Section 2 
of Article XIII, relating to tax exen1ptions; both of these 
proposed a1nendments "~ere separately set out on the bal-
lot in such a manner as to allow the voter to express him-
self separately .on each issue. It would appear clea.r then, 
that unless Article "\TII. Section 24 \Yas in fact two amend-
ments, that there was no violation of the constitutional 
requirement. 
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~I:'he general rule of construction adopted with refer-
ence to constitutional provisions like that contained in 
Article XXIII, Section 1, is that if a constitutional 
amendment embracing several subjects, all of which are 
gennane to the general subject of the amendment, is 
adopted, it will be upheld. 6 RCL 30. As is said in 16 
C.J .S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 9: 
"In order to constitute more than one pro-
posed amendment, within such a constitutional 
provision, the propositions submitted must not 
only relate to more than one subject, but 1nust 
also have at least two separate and distinct Jnl r-
po.ses not dependent on, or connecte:d w1.th, each 
other, and although a proposed amendment em-
braces more than one subject, stttch subjects need 
not be separately subm.itte.d to the elector.s. if they 
are so concerned with, or dependent on, the gen-
eral subject that it m~ght be undesirable that one 
be adopted and not the other." 
Jiany cases have recognized this rule. It is not necessary 
that every possible change or abolition of the Constitu-
tion be set out for yea and nay ballot, but only those that 
are in fact separate and distinct and not dep~endent or 
connected \Yith one another. People ex rel. Elder v. 
Sours. 31 Colo. 369, 74 Pac. 167 (1903); McBee v. Brady, 
15 Idaho 161, 100 Pac. 97 (1909); Lobaugh v. Cook, 127 
Io\va 181, 102 N.",V. 1121 (1905); Winget v. Holm, 187 
~[inn, 78, 2-!-t X.\V. 331 (1932). 
In the case of Kirby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 36 P.2d 
549 (1934), the Supreme Court of Arizona spoke to the 
matter and stated the constitutional requirement thus : 
''We think amendments to the Constitution, which 
the section above quoted requires shall be sub-
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1nitted separately, must be construed to mean 
anten.dments which have different objects and pur-
poses in view. In order to constitute more than 
one a1nendment, the propositions subn1itted must 
relate to more than one subject, and have at least 
two distinct and separate purposes not dependent 
d .h h h ***" upon or connecte w1t eac ot er . 
''If the different changes contained in the pro-
posed amendment all cover matters necessary to 
be dealt with in some manner, in order that the 
Constitution as amended, shall constitute a con-
sistent and workable whole on the general topic 
embraced in that part which is amended, and if 
logically speaking, they should stand or fall as a 
"\vhole, then there is but one amendment sub-
mitted." 
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Florida, 
Gray v. Golden, 89 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1956), concerned the 
interpretation of the sin1ilar provision of the Florida 
Constitution concerning ho1ne rule of a local eounty. The 
court said that the provisions for amendment of the 
c:onstitution are mandatory, and further stated: 
''In the City of Coral Gables v. Gary~ supra, "\Ye 
took pains to relate that even though a proposed 
amend1nent 1nay be separable into tzco or nzore 
propositions concerning the t·alue of u·h£ch direr-
sity of opi-nion 1nay arise. that alone i.s 110f suf-
fvcent to condernn it; provided, the propositions 
1nay be logically vie,ved as having a natural rela-
tion a~d connect~on as component parts or aspects 
of a s1ngle don11nant purpose. Unity of purpose 
as revealed in the object sought by the a1nendment 
iR the test; thl' details leading to it are not 1na-
terial. If several propositions that are unrelated 
are subn1itted as one and cannot be reconciled as 
such on any reasonable thesis, then they meet the 
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condeu1nation of the constitutional Inandate. \v~ e 
have no such situation here, local self-government 
for Dade County is the only concern of the pro-
posed an1endment." 
[ t has also been said: 
''This requirement necessitates the separate sub-
Inission of such amendments only as have differ-
ent objects and purposes, becnuse se,l:eral changes 
necessary to carry out a single purpose constitute 
one amendment." 
1() C.J.S. 59. See State v. Lockhart, 76 Ariz. 3901, 265 
P.~d 4-1:7 ( 1953). 
Having, therefore, framed the legal rule relating to 
the con~~titutional requirement, is such rule violated when 
applied against our present amendment~ Plaintiff ar-
gues that because the amendment provides: 
· • X ot\\~ithstanding any general or special pro-
vi~ions of the Constitution the legislature, in order 
to insure continttity of state and local government 
operati'ons in periods of e1nergency 1·esulting frrnn 
disasters caused by eneJJZY attack shall have the 
po-vver * * * .", 
that this e1npo\vers the Legislature to amend the Consti-
tution and that every la\v passed (see H.B. 81, 82, 83, 
1959 Legislature) works an amendment of the Constitu-
tion. Defundants disagree. It seeins obvious that only 
subject is involved in the amendment, and that is the 
preservation of government in periods of emergency 
caused by enemy attack. A whole ne\v provision has been 
added to the Constitution, all the provisions of the amend-
:alent relate to continuity of government, and all laws 
passed under thi~ provision are thereby so limited. 
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The amendment embraces only one homogenous sub-
ject - continuity of government in periods of disaster or 
emergency due to enemy attack. It is clear then that the 
single object test laid down by the courts has been met. 
Any law passed contrary to such object would be invalid, 
and although laws may be passed touching other sub-
jects, their object is the same - continuity of government, 
and no amendment of the Constitution takes place. As 
was said in Continuity of Government, Executive Office 
of the President, 1959, p. 9 : 
"So, the power granted by the amendment is 
broad. It could not be otherwise considering the 
contingency to 'vhich it is addressed. 
For all the breadth of the grant, however, the 
amendment gives no blank check to the Legis-
lature. On the contrary, the power is subject to 
limitations. For one thing, they are implicit in 
the structure of the amendment. Thus the amend-
ment is phrased in terms of a grant of new power 
(not removal of limits of existing po·u;ers) for the 
attainment of a stated objective, namely: Cor~r­
tinuity of governmental operations." 
From this it can be seen that no objection to the 
amendment exists from the standpoint of multiplicity. 
Any deviation fro1n other constitutional provisions can 
only be made to preserve the continuity of government 
and apply the nevv po"Ters of the ne"T amendment. In 
the n bsence of their application, all other powers con-
tinue to exist. See Continuity of Government, supra, p. 
10, and the Federal Constitution stands as a bul\vark 
against improper action. Op. Cit., p. 10. 
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There is no need to consider whether any laws passed 
by the Legislature are presently unconstitutional since 
they are not before us; and to the degree they do not 
conforn1 to the single object of the amendment would be 
void in any instance. The amendment is rnerely an en-
abling provision and its central object is that of adding 
to the Con8tituition powers of preservation by civil ac-
t ion, and avoiding the prospects of martial rule. 
The instant amendment, therefore, is not void, since 
it is a consistent and workable provision relating to one 
single subject. Other provisions of the Constitution are 
till ap·plicable except where disruption of the continuity 
of government due to enemy attack would prohibit their 
application, and in such an instance the provisions of 
.A.rticle VII, Section 24, come into effect. The new amend-
Inent does not vacate but supplements other provisions 
of the Constitution by providing for a continuation of 
civil government when no government might otherwise 
exist. 
POINT III. 
THE AMENDMENT WAS NOT DEFECTIVE FOR FAlL-
URE TO SUBMIT THE AMENDl\iENT TO THE ELECTOR-
ATE IN PROPER FORM. 
The Secretary of State was directed to submit the 
proposed amendment, Article VII, Section 24, to the 
electorate at the next general election, and the amend-
ment was to be submitted in the manner provided by la\v. 
J.R. 12 :Jiarch 1959, Section 2. Acting in accord \vith the 
instructions appearing in the joint resolution, the Secre-
tary of State caused the following proposition to be 
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placed upon the ballot and submitted to the electorate 
at the general election on November 8, 1960 : 
"Shall Section 24 of Article \:II of the Constitu-
tion of the State of lJtah be amended to grant 
temporary emergency powers to the Legislature 
in the event of 'var or emergency caused by war." 
Plaintiff urged in the trial court that for two reasons 
this statement of the issue on the ballot renders the con-
stitutional amendment invalid. First, because it pur-
ported to amend Section 24 Article VII when no such 
section existed, and secondly because the word ",, .. ar" 
rather than attack was used in describing the amendment. 
In considering the validity of the arguments raised by 
plaintiff, it should be pointed out that Section 1, Article 
XXIII of the State Constitution makes no specific pro-
vision as to how the particular amendment will be set out 
on the ballot. The only reference in that section as to what 
the Legislature should cause to be done after approving 
the amendment is the following: 
4 ~ * * * and the legislature shall cause the san1e to 
be published in at least one ne,vspaper in every 
count)~ of the state for t,,~o Inonths in1n1ediately 
preceding the next general election~ at "~hich time 
the said amendment or amend1nents shall be sub-
nlitted to the electors of the state * * * .'' 
It appears from the \\Tording of the a1nendlnent that 
the founding fathers intended the voters to be appraised 
of the contents of the constitutional a1nenillnent by ne" .. s-
paper notice; and that the ballot provide son1e 111eans of 
i<lPntif:Ying the amend1nent proposed and a n1eans of 
approving or rejecting it. Section 20-11-19, U.C.A. 1953 
' 
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relating to the 1nanner of voting on public measures, 
states: 
HThe 1nanner of voting upon measures submitted 
to the people shall be as follows : 
The nu1nber and ballot title herein provided for 
shall be printed upon the official ballot, with the 
\rords • For' and "Against' immediately to the 
right thereof, each followed by a square in \Yhieh 
the elector 1nay place a cross to indicate his vote. 
Electors desiring to vote "for' shall place a cross 
\rithin the square following the word 'for,' and 
those desiring to vote • against' shall place a cross 
\\'"i thin the square follo,ving the \Vord 'against.' " 
In the instant case the ballot title of the Continuity of 
Government Amendment was set out as Constitutional 
Amendment Number One, plus the above recited lan-
guage, and a place to vote for and against set out on the 
ballot. Although the above statute may be limited to 
referendum or initiative, it appears that there can be 
no objection for failure to follow the standard form of 
~~nbn1itting matters to the "people". 
The fact that the Constitution makes requisite the 
publication of the proposed amendment in the ne\vspaper 
cannot be passed too lightly. In the case of 811Aow v. 
Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 234 (1948), the Utah 
Supre1ne Court \vas faced with an argument claiming to 
invalidate a proposed adoption of a constitutional amend-
Inent, because of a failure to post cards as required by 
20-7 -±, U.C.A. 1953. The Supreme Court, in rejecting 
the argument, stated: 
"It should be remembered that the an1en~dment is 
not printed in full on the ballot. It is 1netr:ely 
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designated thereon by number and title, as. is pre-
viously indicated in this opinion. Such be1n? the 
case, the notice of importance to_ the voter ts the 
publi,cat.ion in the. newspapers pnor to the g_e·neral 
election. This is the publication that perm1~s the 
voter time to consider the merits or dements of 
the proposed change. At most, the card in the vot-
ing booth could only be a helpful reminder of the 
general sense of the proposed change. Failure of 
the county clerk to furnish cards complete in all 
details might be a violation of the statute, but it 
would not prevent passage of the proposed joint 
resolution. 
lT nder our constitutional requirements, notice 
must be carried in the newspapers, and if publi-
cation was of the complete proposed joint resolu-
tion including the provision for a delayed effective 
date, then the mere fact that this date was not also 
published on the cards does not require a holding 
that the proposition to postpone has not been sub-
nlitted to the voters. All voters throughout the 
state are en ti tied to notice, and the fact that one 
county clerk may or may not have included all of 
the necessary information on the cards is not 
fa tal to the passage of the complete resolution. If 
our constitution or statutes made no provision for 
general publication, and provided that it was 
necessary that the proposed amendment and its 
effective date be set out in full on the ballot, then 
the failure to include the proposition of a delayed 
date might constitute a failure to submit that por-
tion of the propose~ . a_mendment to the people. 
However, the probabilities and possibilities of the 
voter being fully informed of the context of an 
a_1ne~d1~ent are reasonably assured of the pubilca-
tion Is In ~he newsp_apers. Accordingly. the 'tneth-
od of noh.ce prescr1.bed by the co'nSt:ifufl~on is o·ue 
reason~1bly calculated to gve noh~ce to the voters 
and thts 1n(_Jthod u:as here coJnplied 1rith. This i.._~ 
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u.;as sJtbmitted to the voters for approval or dis-
sufficient to sustain a finding that the proposed 
antendment including its delaye.d effective date 
approval. * * *" 
Thus, the Suprerne Court has clearly recognized that the 
essential notice to the voters cornes not from the ballot, 
but frorn the newspapers, and that the ballot merely 
provides a vehicle for expressing the voters' feelings on 
the issue. Adding to the argument that the ballot is to 
provide nothing more than a vehicle for expressing favor 
or disfavor on a proposed amendment is 20-3-41, U.C.A. 
1953, which provides that Secretary of State shall, with 
reference to such proposed amendments: 
'' * * * certify the same to the county clerk of each 
county, designating such arnendment or question 
by number and also by a title which shall cover 
the subject matter of the amendrnent or question 
submitted* * *." 
It is clearly manifest that what appears on the ballot need 
be only a reference to the amendment sufficient to identi-
fy the subject matter so as not to confuse the voter as to 
other similar propositions that may be on the ballot. 
\Vhen considered in this light is becomes clear that the 
proposed amendment was not faulty for failure to be 
properly submitted to the electorate. It is clear that the 
amendn1ent need' not be set out in full, Snow v. Kedding-
ton, supra; Jones v. McDade, 200 Ala. 230, 75 So. 988; 
see 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law., p. 57, where it is said: 
''The ballot need not contain the amendment in 
full since it is presumed that every voter received 
the benefit of notice through publication rn ex-
tenso of the proposed amendment." 
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The rule is well stated by the Supreme c·ourt of Louisiana 
in Hota~d v. City of New Orleans, 213 La. 843, 35 So.2d 
752, where the court said: 
"The second ground of attack upon the validity 
of the constitutional amendment is that the voters 
were not properly notified or informed of the con-
tents or provisions of the amendment. All that 
the Constitution-Section 1 of Article 21-re-
quires in that respect is that the Secretary of 
State shall cause the proposed amendment to be 
published in a newspaper in each parish in which 
a newspaper is published, twice within not less 
than 30 days nor more than 60 days preceding the 
election at which the amendment is to be sub-
mitted to the voters. It is admitted that the Secre-
tary of State did cause this amendment to be 
published in full in one newspaper in every parish 
in the state, t".,.ice \Yithin not less than 30 nor 
more than 60 days preceding the election at ,, ... hicb 
the amendment was voted upon. It appears in 
some of the briefs for the appellants- and was 
revealed in their oral arguments-that they have 
confused the 1nanner of submitting constitutional 
amendments on the printed ballots \Yith the nlan-
ner in which notice shall be given by publication 
in the ne\\rspapers. The publication in the news-
papers gves the voters full inforn1ation as to the 
contents or provisions of a proposed constitu-
tional amendment. All that is requtred to be 
printed on the ballot is sufficient i~n.fornzation to 
ident~ify the proposed anzendnzent which the voter 
is voting for o·r against. * * *'' 
In applying this rule to the facts of this case and 
' recognizing that the statutory limitations of 20-3-41, 
U.C.A. 1953, merely requires that the ballot refer to the 
subject matter to be considered, it appears clear that the 
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ballot was sufficient. The Constitution was being con-
sidered for amendment on two questions, one concerning 
the amendment to preserve the continuity of government 
in the event of enemy attack, and the other a tax exemp-
tion matter. It appears clear that as between the two 
propositions under consideration, no confusion could 
result. Plaintiff objects because the word "war" was 
used rather than ''attack''. The words are not so dis-
similar as to be confusing. Pearl Harbor was an attack; 
would anyone deny it was not also war~ The similarity 
of meaning is pointed up by comparing Webster's defi-
nition of attack: 
"Act of falling on with force or violence," 
with that of war: 
"'The state or fact of exerting force or violence 
against another." 
The dissimilarity, if any exists, appears purely semantic. 
It seems clear that the wording of the amendment was 
~ufficient to satisfy the subject matter requirements, 
since all express or implied powers created by a proposed 
amendrnent need not be set out. State v. Hess, 133 Ore. 
91, 288 Pac. 505; Swa~in v. Tuscaloosa County, 103 So.2d 
7 69 ( ... t\.la. 1958) . 
There is no question but what Article VII, Section 
2-! amends the Constitution by adding a new section and 
ne\v subject matter, but the imperfections of title are 
not those confusing of subject matter. The test is clearly 
one of substantial compliances, and this having been 
done, plaintiff cannot complain. Opinion of the Justices, 
10-! So.2d 696 (Ala. 1958). 
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The language of the Utah Supreme c·ourt is applie-
able to· this situation in a case where the court was also 
faced with a technical claim of an erroneous title. In 
Salt L.ake City v. Tax Commission, No. 9347 (10 Feb-
ruary 1961), the Court said : 
"We think that a reading of the whole title and the 
\vhole act * * * may be an indictment of legisla-
tive articulation, but not legislative intent." 
By the same standard, the ballot title relating to the 
continuity of government may be somewhat inarticulate, 
but there is no confusion as to the subject matter to be 
passed on by the people. 
On this basis it is submitted that no basis for dis-
approving the adoption of the amendment exists. 
The rule is that the form of the ballot should be in 
the form, if any, prescribed by the Constitution. 16 
C.J.S., Consti-tutional Law, Sec. 9 However, the Utah 
Constitution makes no specific requirements as to the 
form of the ballot. Therefore, "on submission of a pro-
posed constitutional amendment, all that is required to be 
printed on the ballot is sufficient infor1nation to identify 
the proposed amendment which the voter is voting for 
or against." 16 C.J.S., p. 57; Hotard r. City of }-l eu.J 
Orleans, supra. In the instant case the title does not 
confuse· as to the subject of the amendment and clearlY 
' . cli~tinguishes it from other propositions 
Article VII~ Section 24, therefore, \Yas properly 
adopted, and the minor irregularities on the ballot that 
did not relate to another subject matter are of no im-
portance. 
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POINT IV. 
THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE IV, SECTION 4 OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION NOR AMEND OR CONTRADICT 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
On the trial level and in his complaint the plaintiff 
contends that the proposed constitutional amendment is 
void because of a substantive reasons; that it violates 
Article IV, Section 4 of the Federal Constitution, and 
that it amends Article I, Section 2, of the Utah Consti-
tution, doing so without allowing a separate vote thereon. 
The last contention is a procedural objection previously 
answered. 
Article IV, Section 4 provides in its relevant por-
tions: 
"The United States shall guarantee to every State 
in this lTnion, a republican form of government 
* * * " 
In Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849), the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that this section was not 
one 'vith which the judiciary should be concerned since 
it "~as related to ''political matters." Thus the court held 
it 'vas without jurisdiction to pass upon a queston rais-
ing this issue. Professor Corwin, commenting on this 
provision, notes: 
"''The United States' here means the governing 
agency created by the Constitution, but especially 
the President and Congress; for the Court has 
repeatedly declared that ''That is a 'republican 
form of government' is a 'political question,' and 
one finally for the President and the houses to 
determine 'vithin their respective spheres." 
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Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today, 12th 
Ed., p. 174. 
The fact that there may be a great deal of ''direct 
" bl" government" does not make a government unrepu l-
ean." Paci~fic States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 
118 (1912). Therefore, it is submitted that the argument 
is not one that this Court may hold to void the amend-
ment. 
Nor is the present amendment in any fashion unre-
publican for it provides for a continuation of representa-
ton through persons able to carry on where otherwise 
martial rule or some other military government would 
be necessary. It should be noted that the amendment 
applies "in periods of emergency resulting from disasters 
caused by enemy attack." In Ex Parte 11/illigan, 4: ,.Vall 
2 (1866), and Dtttncan v. K.ahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 
(1945), the United States Supreme Court held that as 
long as the civilian courts were open and civil govern-
ment was able to function, there "~as no need for military 
government. A reading of the facts of these t"~o cases 
reveals the unfortunate consequences that can result from 
1nilitary rule. During the course of martialla"'" civilians 
may be administratively ruled by the complete execu-
tive authority of the military. Fairman, The Law of 
llfar·tial Rule, 2nd Ed. (1943); Civil Law, Department 
of the Air Force, AFl\I 110-3, p. 289. They 111ay be 
judicially tried by provost courts or military commis-
sions, and are not directly entitled to be treated as Inili-
tary personnel subject to the Uniform Code of }.filitary 
Justice, and hence are denied the safeguards contained 
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therein. See Richardson, A State of War and the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, 47 ABAJ 792 (1961). 
In Ex Parte lllilligan, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court said of martial law: 
HThat in a time of war the commander of an armed 
force (if in his opinvon the exigencies of the 
country demand it, and of which he is to judge), 
has the power, within the lines of his military 
district, to suspend all civil rights and their rem-
edies, and subject citizens as well as soldiers to 
the rule of his will; and in the exercise of his law-
ful authorty cannot be restrained, except by his 
superior officer or the President of the United 
States. If this position is sound to the extent 
clamed, then when war exists, foreign or domes-
tic, and the country is subdivided into military 
departments for mere convenience, the commander 
of one of them can, if he chooses, within the limits, 
on the plea of necessity, with the approval of the 
Executive, substitute military force for and the 
exclusion of the laws, and punish all persons, as 
he thinks right and proper, without fixed or cer-
tain rules. The statement of this propositon shows 
its importance; for, if true, republican govern-
ment is a failure, and there is an end of liberty 
regulated by law. l\Iartial law, established on 
such a basis, destroys every guaranty of the Con-
stitution, and effectually renders the 'military 
independent of and superior to the civil power.' " 
Although martial law was not wholly approved, and 
is not always carried so far, it is recognized as the law of 
necessity, and when the "necessity" is present it may be 
carried to such extremes, limited only by "necessity". 
Corwin, supra, p. 122-123. Thus, if the discretion of the 
military commander is limited only by "necessity", and 
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the necessity in wartime is as was noted in the Minnesota 
Moratorium Case, 290 U.S. 398, 426: 
"[the] power to wage war, successfully, an~ thus 
permits the harnessing of the entire energies of 
the people in a supreme cooperative effort to 
preserve the nation." 
If this discretion based on "necessity" is legal, as it is 
where real necessity decrees, Walker, Military Law, p. 
474, et seq., then certainly the same powers are legal 
where necessity decrees when exercised by civil officers 
acting under approved constitutional authority. 
The Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Civil and Defense ~Iobilization, in the volume Continuity 
of Government (1959) speaks of the purposes of the 
amendment in the following terms: 
''The last decade has witnessed the evolution of 
the nuclear 'veapon. ~Ieanwhile, the traditionally 
important military factors of time and distance 
have been all but removed by the development of 
ballistic missile capabilities. 
The concept of modern \Yar ('vhich involves prin-
cipally the doctrine of deterrence through the 
strategies of 'massive retaliation' and 'counter-
force f'uperiority') de1nands that 1neasures be 
undertaken to increase the effectiYe defense of 
our civilian society and this ~ ation ·s traditional 
for1n of govern1nent. This is true prin1arilY be-
cause of the destruction "~hich "-rould result t~ our 
industrial and population centers if an enen1Y 
attack is thrust upon ns either throur~·h ina.dYert-
Pll<!P or the failure of deterrence. ._ 
The cap~bility of thi~ Nation to survive an enemY 
attar k \Vlll be determined by the state of readines.s 
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of both our military and non-n1ilitary defenses. 
Non-military defense is comprised of two princi-
pal elements, i.e. civil defense and defense mobili-
zation. * * * • 
The obvious need in many States for legislation 
to establish a sound legal basis upon which State 
and local governments can formulate their emer-
gency government plans has prompted the Execu-
tive Office of the President, through the Office 
of Civil and Defense Mobilization (wth the assis-
tance of the Columbia Legislative Drafting Re-
search Fund of Columbia University Council for 
Ato1nic Age Studies), to prepare the suggested 
legislation contained in this book. The legisla-
tion is designed to permit the States and their 
political subdivisions to accomplish the first and 
third of the foregoing objectives. 
ln addition, the develop~ment of the capability by 
State and local governments to continue function-
ing in the event of attack will assure, to the 
greatest degree possible, that the invocation of 
~fartial Law will not be necessary. 1\tfilitary gov-
ernment is the antithesis of civil government. If 
the States, counties, and cities carry out a con-
tinuity of government program, they \vill make a 
substantial contribution to,vard guaranteeing that 
recovery of the Nation will be accomplished under 
the direction of civil authority. This vvill facili-
tate the maintenance of the Nation in accordance 
w·ith our traditional concepts of constitutional 
govern1nen t." 
Therefore, the amendment is directed towards preserving 
the republican form of government in the face of circum-
stanc-es 'vhere anarchy \\"'ould otherwise reult. The plain-
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tiff has strongly attacked the portion of the amendment 
which provides : 
" * * * In the exercise of the powers hereby con-
ferred the legislature shall in all respects conform 
to the requirements of this Constitution ex~pt 
to the extent that in the judgment of the legisla-
ture so to do would be impracticable or would ad-
mit of undue delay." 
But these powers are no different than the same dis-
cretionary powers exercised in proclaiming martial law 
except less severe. In addition, a reasonable standard of 
"impracticability" and necessity govern their use. This 
is a sufficient legal standard. Williamson v. Lee Optical 
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951). As was noted in Continuity of Govern-
ment, p. 9: 
"For another thing, the amendment itself is ex-
plicit on the matter of limitations. It lays down 
the general standard that the Legislature must 
conform to the Constitution of the State in all 
that it does in exercise of the new powers. To be 
sure, the general standard is immediately followed 
by an exception under 'Yllich the Legislature is 
permitted to deviate from those require1nent~ 
when in its judgn1ent conformitY "-ould be im-
practicable or "Tould admit of u~due delaY. The 
fact that the deter1nina tion of the q u e ~ t i o n 
-w·hether and ho"T far to deviate is entrusted to the 
judgment of the Legislature "ithout recourse to 
the courts (as wo~ld have been possible if the 
amendment spoke In ter1ns of 'findings' bY the 
~egilature) ~hould_not cause any great appr~hen­
sion. There IS nothing novel in the idea that Leo-is-
latures ~ay. take decisi?ns, indeed final decisi;ns, 
on constitutional questions. As a 1natter of fact, 
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the trend in the Supreme Court of the United 
States is toward a larger acceptance of the legis-
lative judgment as to the permissible range of 
legislative power. The trend is almost pronounced 
in respect of legislation for the regulation of eco-
nomic affairs, but it is also noticeable in respect 
of legislation affecting civil liberties. Sometimes 
the Court goes further and disavows jurisdiction 
altogether in cases where it deems the constitu-
tional (_1uestion more appropriate for disposition 
by political rather than judicial processes. For 
example, the Court will have nothing to do with 
the question whether the scheme of government 
set up by a State constitutes a 'republican form 
of government' as guaranteed to the States by the 
Constitution; rather it leaves the matter to the 
attention of the political branches, Congress or 
the President or both." 
On this basis it must be noted that there is no substan-
tive violation of Article IV, Section 4 of the United 
States Constitution. 
The claim of violation of Article I, Section 2 of the 
Gtah Constitution, which provides: 
"All political power is inherent in the people; and 
all free governments are founded on their author-
ity for their equal protection and benefit, and 
they have the right to alter or reform their governr 
ment as the public welfare may require." 
is equally invalid for the same reasons set out above. It 
should be noted that this p-rovision give the people the 
right to "alter or reform their government as the public 
"\Yelfare may require.'' 
This is "\Yhat Article VII, Section 24 has made provision 
for in the event of necessity occasioned by enemy attack. 
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This, in addition, accords with Article I, Section 1 of the 
State Constitution, providing: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right 
to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties." 
This is the functional purpose of Article VII, Section 24, 
and, therefore, no substantive objection to its provisions 
exists. 
The contention that Article I, Section 2 is amended 
is, therefore, incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
The above points have attempted to analyze the ob-
jections made by plaintiff to the adoption of Article VII, 
Section 2-± of the State Constitution, raised in his com-
plaint and argument in the proceedings before the trial 
court. It is submitted that none of the matters complained 
of 'York to void the amendment, and therefore, the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment declaring 
Article VII, Section 24 void and of no effect. This Court 
should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted 
'\T ALTER L. Bl~DGE 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant AttoTney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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